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Abstract 
The buildup of so-called "greenhouse gases" in the atmosphere - COz in 
particular - appears to be having an adverse impact on the global climate. 
This paper briefly reviews current expectations with regard to physical and 
biological effects, their potential costs to  society, and likely costs of abate- 
ment. For a "worst case" scenario it is impossible to assess, in economic 
terms, the full range of possible nonlinear synergistic effects. In the "most 
favorable" (although not necessarily "likely") case (of slow-paced climate 
change), however, it seems likely that the impacts are within the "afford- 
able" range, a t  least in the industrialized countries of the world. In the 
"third world" the notion of affordability is of doubtful relevance, making the 
problem of quantitative evaluation almost impossible. We tentatively assess 
the lower limit of quantifiable climate-induced damages at US$30 to US$35 
per ton of T O 2  equivalent", worldwide, with the higher level of damages 
being concentrated in regions most adversely affected by sea-level rise. The 
non-quantifiable environmental damages are also significant and should by 
no means be disregarded. 
The costs and benefits of (1) reducing CFC use, and (2) reducing fossil 
fuel consumption, as a means of abatement, are considered in some detail. 
This strategy has remarkably high indirect benefits in terms of reduced air 
pollution damage and even direct cost savings to consumers. The indirect 
benefits of reduced air pollution and its associated health and environmen- 
tal effects from fossil-fuel combustion in the industrialized countries range 
from US$20 to US$60 per ton of COz eliminated. In addition, there is good 
evidence that modest (e.g., 25%) reductions in COz emissions may be achiev- 
able by the USA (and, by implication, for other countries) by a combination 
of increased energy efficiency and restructuring that would permit simulta- 
neous direct economic benefits (savings) to energy consumers of the order of 
US$50 per ton of COz saved. A higher level of overall emissions reduction - 
possibly approaching 50% - could probably be achieved, at little or no net 
cost, by taking advantage of these savings. 
We suggest the use of taxes on fossil fuel extraction (or a carbon tax) as a 
reasonable way of inducing the structural changes that would be required to 
achieve significant reduction in energy use and COz emissions. To minimize 
the economic burden (and create a political constituency in support of the 
approach) we suggest the substitution of resource-based taxes in general for 
other types of taxes (on labor, income, real estate, or trade) that are now 
the main sources of government revenue. While it is conceded that it would 
be difficult to calculate the "optimal" tax on extractive resources, we do not 
think this is a necessary prerequisite to policy-making. In fact, we note that 
the existing tax system has never been optimized according to  theoretical 
principles, and is far from optimal by any reasonable criteria. 
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The Greenhouse Effect: 
Damages, Costs, and 
Abatement 
1. Introduction 
Human economic and industrial activity has reached a level of intensity 
that threatens the stability of the global atmosphere-biosphere system. One 
consequence to be expected is a significant warming of the climate. The 
proximate cause is a buildup of the concentrations of several trace gases 
in the atmosphere. The so-called Radiatively Important Gases (RIGs) are 
carbon dioxide (COz), nitrous oxide (N20),  methane (CH4), tropospheric 
ozone (03) ,  and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). Since pre-industrial times the 
first four gases have increased by 25%, 96%, 8%, and 0-25%, respectively 
(Ramanathan, 1988). CFCs are purely anthropogenic, having been invented 
in the early 1930s. They are used commercially as refrigerants, solvents, and 
foaming agents. 
These greenhouse gases or RIGs are transparent to incoming short-wave 
(visible) radiation but they strongly absorb and reradiate long-wave thermal 
radiation. The net result is to change the radiative balance of the earth in 
such a way that more energy is trapped. Table 1 shows the relative potency 
(absorptive power), atmospheric lifetime, and the contribution of different 
RIGs to global warming. Carbon dioxide is still the major contributing gas 
(about 50% of the total effect) and comes mostly from the burning of fossil 
fuels. 
The expected increase of C 0 2  and C02-equivalent concentrations is 
shown in Figure 1. Doubling of C 0 2  equivalent gases (written as 2 x C 0 2  
T a b l e  1. Global warming potentials for various greenhouse gases on mole and weight bases relative t o  COz. 
Molar basis Weight basis 
hsidence Instantaneous Cumulative Global Cumulative Global 
time forcing forcing warming forcing warming 
Gas (Y rs) (W m-2 ppm-') (W m-2yr Pmol-l) potential (W m-'yr Pg-l) potential 
Coz 230 0.015 19 1 .O 0.42 1 .O 
CO (2.1) (0.65) 26 1.4 0.94 2.2 
CH4 (14.4) (0.65) 71 3.7 4.4 10 
N20 160 3.8 3,400 180 77 180 
HCFC-22 15 190 15,000 810 180 410 
CFC- 11 60 220 74,000 4,000 540 1,300 
CFC-12 120 280 190,000 10,000 1,600 3,700 
Source: Lashof and Ahuja (1990). 
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Figure 1. Expected increase of C 0 2  and C02-equivalent concentrations. 
for convenience) will occur between 2030 and 2090 according to conventional 
"high" and "low" emissions scenarios. 
One of the major uncertainties in the system is ocean uptake. Today, 
it is generally believed that about 50% of anthropogenic C 0 2  emissions are 
absorbed by the ocean, the remainder accumulating in the atmosphere. The 
accumulation (which is directly measurable), of course, leads to other effects. 
One of them is an increased rate of photosynthesis. However the rate of 
absorption (net of re-emission) by the oceans is still somewhat uncertain, 
and the exact role of the various actors in the system is still open to question. 
Carbon dioxide is an essential input to photosynthesis by green plants. 
From laboratory experiments, it is estimated that a doubling of the ambient 
C 0 2  concentration would cause a 10-50% increase in the yield of so-called 
C3 crops (e.g., wheat, rice) and a 0-10% increase in yield of Cq crops (e.g., 
corn). Depending on specific crop and growing conditions, the amount of 
water required to fix a unit of carbon is reduced, increasing yields in cases 
of growth limited by water availability (Bolin et al., 1986). Leaf stomata, 
where gas exchange takes place (C02 in, 0 2  and water vapor out) tend 
to decrease in size. Whether the effect of C 0 2  "fertilization" will occur 
in open fields is uncertain. A few ambiguous multiple-year experiments 
reported suggest no permanent increase in the photosynthetic rate (Sedjo 
and Solomon, 1990). The possibility of biochemical surprises cannot be ruled 
out if the concentration of a major component of organic life is doubled. (By 
comparison, the ambient C 0 2  concentration during the last Ice Age, 18,000 
years ago was 25% lower than i t  is now). 
A consequences of overall climate warming is likely to  be changes in 
the temporal and spatial distribution of temperature, precipitation, evapo- 
transpiration, clouds, and air currents. All of these are simulated in so- 
called global circulation models (GCMs), although the detailed results of 
the simulations are not as yet a trustworthy basis for forecasting. (The next 
generation of such models should be considerably improved.) Computations 
carried out to  date, comparing equilibrium for the 2 x C 0 2  condition with 
control runs for current climate, show a very nonuniform response even to 
uniform change in RIGS. In effect, the regional effects are much more variable 
- and uncertain - than the global average projections. (For details see: 
Schneider, 1989a, 1989b, and 1989c; Schneider and Rosenberg, 1990; Bolin 
et al., 1986; USEPA, 1988; Mintzer, 1987.) However, the nonlinear character 
of the system makes it likely that  better GCMs will continue to  exhibit 
significant regional variability. 
The global mean temperature (GMT) is expected to  rise between 2OC 
and 5°C for the 2 x C 0 2  condition (Schneider and Rosenberg, 1990). This 
is remarkable compared to the last Ice Age extreme: 18,000 years ago GMT 
was about 5°C colder than today (Schneider, 1989a). The standard pro- 
jection of global temperature evolution is shown in Figure 2. The regional 
averages change from -3" to  +lO°C with probable changes in seasonality 
and variability. 
Global precipitation is likely to  increase by 7-10% (high confidence); 
regional changes are projected to  range from -20% to +20% (low confidence). 
The largest warming will occur in high latitudes and will be combined with 
large precipitation increases in winter. Higher temperatures will probably 
(high confidence) increase evapo-transpiration by 5-10% on global average. 
Soil moisture is controlled by precipitation, evapo-transpiration, and run-off. 
Regional changes are projected (medium confidence) to  be in the range of 
plus or minus 50% (Schneider and Rosenberg, 1990). 
According to Schneider and Rosenberg run-off would increase globally 
and changes on a regional scale of -50% to  +50% are expected. They are 
direct results of changes in evapo-transpiration (which is strongly influenced 
by temperature) and precipitation. Simulation studies on arid and semiarid 
river basins in the USA suggest that  relatively small changes in temperature 
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Figure 2. Expected temperature rise. Source: Wigley (1987). 
and precipitation can have multiplier effects on run-off (see Table 2).  There 
is evidence that  run-off will increase in winter in high latitudes and decrease 
in summer in mid and low latitudes. These changes in run-off patterns "could 
greatly alter the likelihood of flooding and the availability of water during 
peak-demand periods such as irrigation seasons" (Frederick and Gleick, 1990, 
p. 133). 
Thermal expansion of the ocean water will be the major cause of the 
expected sea-level rise (SLR) in the short term. Robin (1986) has estimated 
the SLR to  be in the range of 0.2 to  1.65 meters. Figure 3 shows a set of 
projections of SLR over time. The disintegration of the Western Antarctic 
Ice Sheet (Ross Sea) will take more than a century. An SLR of five meters 
is not out of the question. It can be regarded: 
. . . either as the worst case tha t  might occur during the next century or as 
an effect tha t  might occcr within three to  five centuries. The  fact that  sea 
level has risen by 65 meters since about 10,000 B.P makes these numbers 
less fanciful than they would otherwise appear. (Hekstra, 1990, p. 56) 
Table 2. Effects on runoff. 
Basin- Temperature Precipitation Annnual runoff 
Study change (OC) change (%) change (%) 
Great Basin +2 - 10 -17 to -28 
+ 10 +20 to +35 
Pease River +3 - 10 -50 
+lo  +35 
Sacramento +2 -10 -18 
+10 +12 
Source: Frederick and Gleick (1990). 
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Figure 3. Projections of SLR over time. 
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Warming of the ocean is a delayed nonuniform process depending on local 
mixing rates. The feedback to  climate will cause a transient phase which is so 
far not predictable with the current (equilibrium) GCMs. Impacts on ocean 
currents like a displacement of the Gulf Stream, or local SLR effects, are not 
taken account of by GCMs available to  date. The major uncertainties of the 
current GCMs arise from inadequate knowledge of the air-ocean interface and 
the influence of cloud feedback. (For a detailed discussion of uncertainties 
and model validation, see Schneider and Rosenberg, 1990.) 
2. Ecological Responses 
The sensitivity of vegetation to climate has been investigated by (Emanuel 
et al., 1985) and (Leemans, 1990) using the so called Holdridge classification. 
Since the broad scale distribution of terrestrial ecosystems is determined to 
a large part by the regional climate, one can relate the character of natu- 
ral vegetation to climatic variables such as average annual temperature and 
precipitation. On the basis of interpolated data from about 8,000 meteoro- 
logical stations a current world map of Holdridge life zones (grid resolution 
of 0.5O x 0.5O latitude and longitude intervals) has been generated by Lee- 
mans and compared to  a corresponding map computed for equilibrium 2 x 
C 0 2  climate. The differences are quite significant. 
The detailed maps cannot be reproduced here, but statistical analysis 
indicates that 48% of the global terrestrial surface would have to change its 
vegetation type. Figure 4 shows results for the most productive life zones 
characterized by average annual temperature warmer than 3"C, and precip- 
itation between 250 and 2,000 mm/yr. Total bar length corresponds to the 
total area of a current life-zone type (in terms of the Holdridge classifica- 
tion). The lower segment corresponds to  the fraction of the area that would 
still belong to the same life-zone with a doubling of the C 0 2  level. The mid- 
dle segment reflects the fraction in which the current life-zone type is likely 
to  be shifted to an adjacent category. The top segment reflects the area in 
which vegetation types can be expected to shift to a non-adjacent category. 
Interpretation of these results is difficult because we have no experience 
with such rapid and broad scale changes in environmental conditions. The 
question that arises is not whether nature can adapt to changing climate in 
general (it can); the question is: how fast can adaptation occur in a natural, 
unmanaged ecosystem, i n  response to global warming 10 to 60 t imes faster 
than any known to have occurred i n  the past? (Schneider and Rosenberg, 
1990). Solomon has calculated that the necessary migration rate of tree 
species to accommodate to 2 x C 0 2  warming in 100 years (it could be even 
faster) has to be ten times higher than rates calculated for North America 
over the past 10 thousand years (Sedjo and Solomon, 1990). 
Barriers, such as agricultural areas and urban areas, will tend to retard 
natural migration rates. As a result, a "rapid loss of tree species form land- 
scape can be projected in the absence of massive reforestation programs" 
(Sedjo and Solomon, 1990, p. 108; also Solomon and West, 1985). As a result, 
a few tree species which have small, wind-dispersed seeds, easily transported 
over large distances, might dominate future landscapes. 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
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Figure 4. Shifts in life zones expected from doubling COz level. Source: Adapted from Leemans (1990). 
Nonlinear response to changes in temperature and precipitation variabil- 
ity, as well as nonuniform biological response to increased C 0 2  concentration, 
will cause shifts in the species composition of biomes. Alteration of several 
fundamental ecosystem processes, such as nutrient cycles, is to be expected. 
An increase in intensity and spread of wildfires due to  higher midsummer 
dryness might occur. Moreover, plant diseases and insect outbreaks severe 
enough to kill dominant species over large areas may occur with greater 
frequency (Batie and Shugard, 1990, p. 125). 
Conservation systems, such as parks, refuges, and preserves which are 
dedicated to protecting wildlife populations may fail under different climatic 
conditions, "By the mid-21st century, the climate that nurtures Yellowstone 
National Park could well be into Canada. The tundra of the Arctic National 
Wildlife Refuge could be pushed into the sea" (Kerr, 1988, p. 23). 
The effects of climatic change will be superimposed on other changes, 
including a general increase in the intensity of land use, forest clearing, 
groundwater withdrawal, soil erosion, and air and water pollution. Acidity, 
of course, is a consequence of the emission of SO, and NO, due to fossil fuel 
combustion. Thus acidity and C 0 2  "enrichment" of the atmosphere tend 
to increase together. Moreover, the environmental stresses due to acidity 
will tend to have a multiplier effect on the stresses of climate change. The 
combination will further weaken the ability of some species to survive. (The 
environmental acidification problem is already severe in some regions; it has 
been blamed for the drastic "dieback" of conifer forests in central and east- 
central Europe). The combination of climate change with other stresses on 
ecosystems could be more dangerous than any one of them taken by itself. 
3. Sea Level Rise and Coastal Impacts 
The impacts of sea-level rise (SLR) on coastal regions are potentially mas- 
sive. Coastlines will move inland up to several hundred meters, in many 
places, depending on beach slope and the characteristics of the beach ma- 
terial (Hekstra, 1990). Salt water will also move upstream via rivers into 
lowland, freshwater pockets behind coastal dunes, and into groundwater 
aquifers. The effect will be magnified in some areas where intensive ground- 
water withdrawal has occurred (e.g., Long Island, New York). 
SLR will cause enormous loss of biologically diverse coastal lowlands 
and wetland ecosystems (Wilson, 1989). For instance, Indonesia possesses 
15% of all world coastline and it is the world's richest country in terms of 
wetland ecosystems quantity and diversity. Yet "at least 40% of its land 
surface is vulnerable to SLR of 1 m" (Wilson, 1989, p. 58). Worldwide, 
the land area that would be subject to inundation or made vulnerable by 
salt water intrusion is about 500 million hectares. This is only about 3% of 
all land area, but it constitutes over 30% of the most productive cropland 
area (Wilson, 1989, p. 60). As many as one billion people now live in the 
vulnerable areas, including some very large cities. Thus, as has been pointed 
out, as much as one-fifth of world market valued assets could be adversely 
affected (Crosson, 1990). 
4. Damages: Summary 
Many environmentalists distrust economic analysis and judge the generation 
of quasi-market prices as ill-suited for the study of economic impacts of global 
climate change, for instance. They tend to advocate notions such as "safe 
minimum standard" as a risk-averse, conservative criterion for the survival of 
species, habitats, and ecosystems, provided the costs are not "unacceptably 
large" (e.g., Batie and Shugard, 1990, p. 129). Yet, these "simple" policy 
instruments are often ineffective in practice, and they may even increase 
costs excessively in relation to  benefits achieved. 
In short, there is no real substitute for economic analysis, however un- 
satisfactory the present state of the subject. Nor do we distinguish (as some 
environmentalists do) between economic costs and "other" costs (such as 
eco-degradation), with the implication that the latter cannot be compared 
with (or traded off against) the former. To us, it is a question of defining the 
realm of economics broadly enough. All costs are economic if the economy 
is properly defined, but not all economic costs are automatically reflected 
in the marketplace (i.e., "market valued"). Nor are non-market-priced en- 
vironmental assets (such as parks or ecosystems) included in the standard 
System of National Accounts (SNA). 
Economists have developed a variety of tools and methods to monetize 
benefits of non-market amenities such as environmental preservation. One 
approach identifies three categories, namely, use, option, and existence value 
(see Greenley et al., 1981; Batie and Shugard, 1990). The "use value" refers 
to the benefits of "using" the ecosystem as a recreation place, e.g., bird 
watching. The "option value" is what potential consumers are willing (in 
principle) to  pay to preserve the amenity for possible later use (e.g., (Krutilla, 
1967; Lindsay, 1969; Byerlee, 1971; Arrow and Fisher, 1974; Henry, 1974). 
Sometimes a category called "quasi-option value" is introduced (Conrad, 
1980). It applies in cases of an irreversible decision on the future of the 
resource and the expectation of new growing knowledge about the useful- 
ness of the resource. Bequest value is what someone in the current (living) 
generation might pay to be able to be assured of passing the amenity on to 
the next generation. 
Actual numerical estimates for these values are normally obtained by one 
of three methods. One method is to measure differences in property prices 
(house prices, rents) in polluted and un-polluted areas for which all other 
factors that might contribute to price differentials are either known or equal 
(see Wicke, 1986; Schulz a n d ~ i c k e ,  1987). This is called the hedonie price 
approach. It is obviously limited in its applicability to a few cases where the 
(large) data requirements can be met. 
Another econometric method applicable to valuation of parks, monu- 
ments, nature reserves, archeological or art objects is to  assume that the 
value of the site or object is proportional to the actual time and money 
expenditures on tourist travel attributable to the site. 
The third method is to ascertain "willingness to pay" (WTP) for an indi- 
cated improvement in environmental quality - such as visibility - by survey- 
ing a representative sample of the regional population, e.g., Bohm (1979). 
Refined sensitivity tests are needed to compensate for so-called "strategic 
behavior" (since those surveyed usually do not actually pay) (Bishop and 
Heberlein, 1979; Survey-type methods have been used for a number of years, 
with increasing levels of sophistication.' A fairly remarkable and robust re- 
sult of such studies is that the non-use related value (option and existence 
value) can easily exceed the direct user benefits of recreation, for instance 
(Greenley et al., 1981; Mitchell and Carson, 1989). 
Notwithstanding the recent methodological progress in this area, the 
problem of quantitative measurement for non-market costs is still far from 
completely solved. In addition to  methodological difficulties and ambigu- 
ities in applying the new indirect methods to assess damages likely to be 
associated with climate change some practical difficulties will also arise: 
'Such methods have been used, for instance, to estimate the benefits of improved water 
quality in the Merrimack River Basin in Connecticut (Oster, 1977), the South Platte River 
Basin of Colorado (Walsh et al. ,  1978; Greenley et al., 1988) and of the Tegeler See in 
W. Berlin, (Ewers and Schulz, 1982), as well as air quality in West Germany (Schulz and 
Wicke, 1987). 
r The climate issue is not local, but regional and global. Hence there is an 
inherent problem with regard to assuring the representativeness of any 
sample survey. 
r Changes will be nonlinear and some will be irreversible (i.e., species ex- 
tinction). 
Interactions on several time-scales can cause numerous unforeseen con- 
sequences. 
Due to the methodological and practical difficulties noted above, simpler 
approaches tend to be used in cases such as the present one. A rather typical 
example is summarized briefly below. 
4.1 Nordhaus' estimates of damage costs 
A recent study by William Nordhaus has attempted to  estimate the eco- 
nomic costs of climate change (Nordhaus, 1989 and 1991). He began with a 
breakdown of the US gross national income or GN12 (for 1981) by sector and 
subdivided it further into regimes of sensitivity. The most climate-sensitive 
sectors were agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, amounting to  3.1% of to- 
tal NI. Moderate sensitivity was attributed to sectors such as construction, 
water transport, utilities etc. These contributed 10.1% of the total. The 
rest (86%) comes from sectors affected negligibly by climate (e.g., mining, 
finance, manufacturing, etc.). 
The results of this analysis were as follows: 
(1) Agriculture damage costs (offset by the C 0 2  fertilization effect) are esti- 
mated as plus or minus US$10 billion as an overall impact on all crops. 
(2) Sea level rise (SLR) damages were estimated for land loss (15,540 square 
km) and protection of high-value property and open coasts by levees 
and dikes. The total market value of the property a t  risk is on the 
order of US$100 billion. Nordhaus converted this to an estimated annual 
equivalent loss of US$6.18 billion per year. (The capital value of property 
should reflect its continuing flow of benefits, thus reflecting tourism losses 
implicitly, at  least so far as providers - hotel and motel operators and so 
on - are concerned. What is omitted is the loss of use and option value 
t o  users, who may not be able to find equivalent amenities elsewhere). 
'Gross National Income (GNI) differs from GNP by excluding indirect business taxes 
and capital set aside to replace depreciation. 
(3) Greenhouse warming is expected to increase aggregate demand for air- 
conditioning (US$1.65 billionlyr) and reduce the demand for space heat- 
ing (US$1.16 billionlyr). Assuming average current prices for electricity 
and fuel, there would be a net annual extra cost to the economy of 
US$0.46 billion (USEPA, 1988). 
(4) No specific estimates were made by Nordhaus for other goods or ser- 
vices (either market-valued or otherwise). In effect, these were lumped 
together and included in the uncertainty of the overall estimate (see be- 
low). 
Summarizing the quantified cost items above, the breakdown is as follows: 
8% attributable to  energy demand changes. 
92% attributable to  SLR (of which 85% is for coastal protection cost - 
levees, seawalls, etc. - and 7% is for loss of low-lying land). 
The bottom line - the central (most likely) estimate of total annual eco- 
nomic damages, D, was US$6.67 billion (1981 dollars), assuming the damages 
occurred in 1981. This is equal to  0.28% of US gross national income for 
that  year. The error bounds were judged (by Nordhaus) to be quite a bit 
higher, due t o  the omitted unquantified items, but still less than two percent 
of national income. 
Gross world income (GWI) in the year 2050 is likely to be more than 
US$26 trillion (1981 dollars) (USEPA, 1989, low GNP case). This is 8.1 
times more than US national income in 1981. Thus Nordhaus judged this 
scaling factor of 8.1 to  be appropriate to  extrapolate the US damage "snap- 
shot" to  global annual damages in 2050 (assuming similarity of income struc- 
tures). In other words, annual world damages due to  greenhouse warming 
are "most likely" to  be about US$54 billion (1981 dollars), with an upper 
limit of US$520 billion. Based on expected emissions of 16.9 billion tons of 
C 0 2  equivalents Nordhaus converted this to  marginal shadow damages of 
emission, namely: central case: US$ 3.3/ton (CO2-equivalent); worst case: 
US$ 36.9/ton (C02-equivalent). 
The above calculation (Nordhaus' numbers) is based on one fairly 
"heroic" (and technically incorrect) assumption with regard to  physical dam- 
age: that  future damage is simply proportional to  RIG emission rates on a 
current basis, i.e., no accumulation of RIGS, and no damage dependence on 
rates of warming. Of course, the economic assumptions are equally strong, 
as already noted. For example, the pattern of energy use in the USA bears 
little relation to the rest of the world. The extrapolation to global scale as- 
sumes a similar balance between air-conditioning and space heating, which 
is somewhat implausible. 
4.2 Modifications to Nordhaus' estimate 
Bearing in mind the long list of potential adverse effects and costs, most of 
which have not been quantified - or even mentioned - by Nordhaus, many 
environmentalists will not be satisfied with the relatively simplistic sort of 
calculation exemplified above. To address these doubts it seems useful to 
examine Nordhaus' assumptions in more detail. We focus, first, on the 
implications of SLR, inasmuch as this item accounts for 92% of the total 
costs identified by Nordhaus. 
With regard to SLR the major costs identified above are protection costs 
of valuable coastal land and beaches (via seawalls, dikes, and levees). The 
total US coast length is about 20,000 km. Average protection costs of about 
US$5 million per km coastline appears reasonable in view of the Dutch ex- 
perience (e.g., Hekstra, 1990). 
The coastline of the world amounts to between 0.5 million and 1 million 
km. To protect it to the same extent as projected in the USA, the total cost 
would be about US$2.5-US$5 trillion, or 10-20% of minimum GWI for 2050. 
Spread in proportion to GWI over 50 years, as Nordhaus did, this comes to 
about 0.2-0.4% of world GWI annually, or roughly what Nordhaus assumed. 
It is a rough magnitude of avoidance costs for the physical protection of 
"protectable" low-lying areas, estuaries and so on. 
Nordhaus' estimate of land-loss cost of 1.55 Mha (million hectares) along 
the US coastline (19,924 km) is equivalent to 77 ha/km coastline. This is a 
factor of ten less than Hekstra's estimate of 500 Mha vulnerable land along 
0.5-1.0 million km coastline, or 500-1000 ha/km (Hekstra, 1990). The land 
value assumed by Nordhaus (US$5000/ha) lies in between Hekstra's estimate 
for arable cropland in Bangladesh (US$3000/ha) and in the Netherlands 
(US$30,000/ha). Assuming Nordhaus' price of US$5000/ha, the total land 
value loss based on Hekstra's estimate of vulnerability, would be US$2.5 
trillion. Spread over 50 years this would account for 0.3% of the world GWI, 
on average. This is still well within Nordhaus' range of error, of course. 
Yet the methodology of estimating potential loss by attaching current 
values to submerged land is inherently suspect, even allowing for "scaling". 
In the first place, current monetary prices of land in different countries clearly 
reflect current levels of money income and exchange rates. In the second 
place, since the total amount of arable land will be reduced in absolute 
terms, it is clear that the price of the remaining land will rise along with 
the sea level. The gain in land values elsewhere could well outweigh the 
coastal losses. Yet one could hardly conclude that SLR might therefore be 
beneficial. Moreover, the remaining land would have to  be cultivated more 
intensively to  make up the shortfall, and food prices will rise, as Schelling 
noted. A gain for the (remaining) farmers, but a loss for consumers. (The 
same valuation problem arises if OPEC succeeds in raising the price of oil). 
The use of land prices (based on current exchange rates) implies that 
coastal land in the USA or the Netherlands is more valuable than coastal 
land in Bangladesh or the Nile Delta. This conclusion makes no sense for a 
study of this kind. Land is more productive in Bangladesh or the Nile Delta 
than in the USA and probably no less productive than in the Netherlands. 
Land value should be related to  its productivity in real terms for purposes 
of assessing long term costs of climate warming. On this basis, land losses 
in Bangladesh or Egypt should be evaluated a t  US$30,000/ha, rather than 
US$3000/ha. Using prices based on international exchange rates underval- 
ues land in poor countries by an by an order of magnitude. Moreover (as 
Nordhaus noted) the USA derives little of its national income from coastal 
lands; the opposite is true in Bangladesh. A loss of 10% of the arable land 
of a country where 70% of the population lives on the land would (roughly) 
cut its real national income by a t  least 7%. It is the exchange rate that is 
artificial and misleading (being based on trade balances in a few portable 
commodities and manufactured goods). If the notion of marginal utility - 
rather than land price - were invoked, it would seem to follow that  the utility 
loss to  Bangladesh must be far greater, per capita, than the utility loss to 
the USA. Thus, the extrapolation from US calculations to  the third world is 
unsatisfactory, to  say the least. 
Since the vulnerable low-lying lands are heavily populated, we must ex- 
pect some environmental refugees. For example, more than 1,000 islands 
in the Maldive Atolls may be swallowed up by the sea. The deltas of the 
Brahmaputra River (Bangladesh) and the Nile River (Egypt) are densely 
populated. Assuming SLR of 0.79 m by the year 2050 and 2.17 m. by 
2100, the homes and livelihoods of 46 million self-supporting people would 
be lost (Jacobson, 1989). Under "really worst case" assumptions, including 
widespread subsidence due to excessive groundwater pumping, the num- 
ber threatened would be substantially higher. Bearing in mind Hekstra's 
estimate of one billion people potentially "affected" by SLR, it is not unrea- 
sonable to  suppose that as many as 100 million people - mainly subsistence 
farmers with no urban experience or skills - may be displaced. They will 
have no place to go except to  the already overcrowded cities. 
How much does a refugee cost? It depends where the refugees are located 
and on their status and skills. Malawi's social cost per Mozambiquan refugee 
is reported as a mere US$24 per capita ( The Economist, February 18, 1989). 
An inquiry by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Food 
Program sets the annual average expenditure of these two official institutions 
per assisted refugee a t  US$72 per capita, or about 20 cents per day; not too 
much. These costs reflect extremely bad conditions, such as those in camps 
for Palestinian refugees located in Lebanon and Jordan. On the other hand, 
the USA spends some US$4,000 per accepted refugee [US$362 million for 
94,000 refugees arriving in 1988 (The Economist, September 24, 1988)]. 
These are just maintenance or resettlement costs. Since a refugee is obvi- 
ously unproductive for some time, i t  would be sensible to  assume one or more 
years of lost output (GNPlcapita). In the case of the "low cost" Palestinian 
refugees, there is no resettlement program and the production loss is much 
more than a year or two - more nearly permanent. The social costs of re- 
pression, terrorism, regional political turmoil, and military/police responses 
to all of the above should be included also. These costs tend to  dwarf the 
pure "subsistence" costs, although they are almost never properly allocated. 
Even in the case of refugees admitted to the USA or other industrialized 
countries, the period of adjustment is significant, especially is the refugees 
are uneducated. In order to get a crude magnitude of likely social costs 
for resettling economic refugees from the poorer countries (within the same 
country) we assume a modest two year period of lost output a t  US$250/yr, 
or US$500/capita a t  1981 income levels. (Comparable GNP/capita figures 
for 1985 were: India US$270, Bangladesh US$160, Egypt US$760 (WRI, 
1989, p. 236). Altogether, this adds up to US$250 billion, over 50 years. 
Assuming significant economic growth in these areas, resettlement costs and 
losses rise in proportion; it would not be unreasonable to  double or even 
quadruple this figure. 
A revised set of SLR costs, based on the above reasoning is as follows: 
coastal protection cost: US$2.5-5 trillion; coastal land loss: US$15 trillion; 
costs of resettling 100 million refugees a t  US$1,000 each: US$1.0 trillion; 
total: US$18.5-21 trillion. 
This is a total for the world as a whole, spread over 50 years as Nordhaus 
did, and therefore comparable to his numbers. Annualized, it comes to  
around 2.1-2.4% gross world income (GWI), or nearly 10 times higher than 
Nordhaus "central" estimate for total costs, and slightly outside his range 
of error. For reasons discussed previously, we think US$30-35 per tonne of 
COa (equivalent) is more realistic than US$3.30, just t o  take account of the 
effects of SLR on countries like Egypt and Bangladesh. 
Of course many indirect effects are still omitted, that  have completely 
unknown shadow costs. One of the most obvious is the implicit assumption 
that there is empty land available somewhere to  resettle the refugees. In fact, 
there is no likelihood of such resettlement. Displaced persons will crowd into 
cities creating squatter settlements that  tax the available city services to the 
limit. These shanty towns are already prime reservoirs of frustration and 
disaffection, and a breeding ground for violence, crime, and civil unrest. 
What  are the true social costs of uprooting people, taking into account 
the breakdown of traditions and family relations, and the resulting social 
problems for the rest of society? We do not know, except that  the costs are 
not zero. 
Moreover, large numbers of refugees in Southeast Asia would augment 
the immigration pressure to  the more highly developed countries in a dra- 
matic way. The boat people from Vietnam may be only the vanguard of an 
enormous migratory wave the world in general (and Australia, in particular) 
is ill-prepared to  cope with. So far, the USA has not succeeded in integrating 
its black population, after 125 years of struggle. Britain has not solved its 
problem with the commonwealth immigrants, France has difficulties with the 
North African immigrants, while West Germany is finding its small Turk- 
ish minority quite indigestible. Lacking adequate "social technologies" most 
countries will, instead, end up spending more money on internal and external 
security. 
In summary, there is good reason to believe that  "when the winners 
and losers have been identified, there will be little interest on the part of the 
winners to alter their status in order to compensate the losers" (Glantz, 1988, 
p. 409). In short, there is increasing risk of tensions, frictions, and conflicts 
threatening political ~ t a b i l i t y . ~  Yet, it is impossible to put a convincing 
number on these indirect effects, if only because the causes of social tensions 
and disruptions are multifarious and the greenhouse efJect contribution is 
likely t o  be relatively minor compared to  other factors. All things considered, 
Nordhaus' estimates seem too optimistic by a considerable margin. 
Before moving on to consider abatement strategies and costs, it must be 
pointed out once again that  Nordhaus' estimates of losses and costs exclude 
3See, for instance, the Brundtland Report (Brundtland, 1987, pp. 291-294, p. 300); 
also Renner (1989, pp. 141-144); and Myers (1989a and 1989b). 
all losses to final users of environmental assets, as well as option and bequest 
value losses. What is the option value of the last Redwood forest or the large 
shade trees on urban streets and in urban parks? Old, slow-growing trees 
like oaks, elms, maples, and beeches are clearly vulnerable to climate change 
(cf. the work of Leemans and Solomon, cited earlier) and are highly valued. 
Since fully grown trees cannot be moved, there is no actual market for them; 
however the retail prices of relatively young trees (around 20 years old) range 
up to US$500. It is quite normal for suburban property owners in the USA 
to spend several hundred dollars per year for tree care. 
If this can be taken as an indicator of the value of the underlying assets, 
then one would have to impute a value of at least several thousand dollars 
to each mature shade tree in a built up area. The number of such trees is 
unknown, but it probably exceeds the number of people (at least in the USA 
and Western Europe). If the life expectancy of shade trees is reduced from 
200 years to  50 years by rapid climate change, there will be a major loss of 
amenity value, and a sharp increase in expenditure on landscaping (the rate 
of tree-planting would have to increase by 4-fold, for instance). Other costs 
of maintaining parks and gardens will also rise sharply. This would translate 
into significant annual costs for both individual homeowners and cities. We 
do not attempt to take the calculation further, except to  note that annual 
expenditures by suburban homeowners of the order of 2% or 3% of income to 
maintain trees and shrubs are by no means uncommon today. (Averages are 
smaller, of course.) Still, an annual average expenditure for this purpose in 
the next half century (including indirect outlays) attributable to the higher 
costs of compensating for effects of climate change, would not be implausible. 
In summary, we suspect that the sum total of potential losses of this type 
greatly exceeds the items that Nordhaus has actually quantified. 
5. Optimal Abatement 
Let us now introduce an hypothetical relationship between emissions dam- 
ages and abatement costs (Figure 5). Assume we know all damages D(z) as a 
function of annual emissions a of greenhouse gases, incorporating present and 
future values, priced and unpriced (see discussion above). Further, assume 
Figure 5. Abatement in economic equilibrium. 
we know the cost function of abatement A(z) for all levels of emissions. 
By assumption A(z) describes the total cost to  an  economy of abating the 
next increment of greenhouse emissions by the most cost-effective available 
means. If reducing fossil fuel combustion is the chosen strategy, then the cost 
curve would reflect the costs of introducing energy-conserving technologies 
or providing alternative fuels, for instance. 
The shape of A(z) is usually derived from two general axioms in economic 
theory, namely, (i) that  the economy is always in (or nearly in) an equilib- 
rium state, and (ii) declining marginal cost-effectiveness of abatement with 
increasing levels of abatement. Given these assumptions, abatement costs 
are zero a t  the laissez-faire point of uncontrolled emissions and increase as 
a function of increasing abatement (COz-equivalent reduction). Because of 
declining marginal cost-effectiveness, the real cost of abatement D(z) can be 
expected to  increase a t  an increasing rate, as shown. 
Optimal 
. . Emission 
:nt level 
reduction 
Figure 6. Optimal abatement in economic disequilibrium. 
The optimal level of abatement is the minimum of the sum D(z)+A(z),  
which has by definition a slope of zero. Both less and more reduction would 
lead to reduced welfare benefit. In other words: the optimal point is char- 
acterized by the equality of the absolute first derivatives (marginal costs) 
of A and D.  Evidently, the marginal benefit of abatement is obtained from 
the slope of the damage cost curve, D(z). The marginal cost of abatement 
is the slope of A(z), where z is measured in percentage of COa-equivalent 
reduction. 
Figure 6 contrasts with the usual version (Figure 5 )  with a rather dif- 
ferent form of the abatement cost curve. It is inconsistent with one of the 
two key assumptions underlying Figure 5 (the equilibrium assumption), but 
we think it comes much closer to reflecting reality. It reflects the view that ,  
in fact, there exists a considerable opportunity to enjoy negative abatement 
costs (i.e., profits) by investing in selected technological "fixes", largely in 
the area of energy conservation. 
The implication, of course, is that ,  for a variety of reasons - including 
massive market failures - the economy has become "locked in" to a subopti- 
mal state of excessive energy/resource dependence.4 We defend this propo- 
sition in more detail below. Of course, the optimum degree of abatement 
is still the point where D(z)+A(z) is minimal. However, it will be noted 
that  the optimal point is significantly to  the right of the corresponding point 
in the case where A(z) is monotonically increasing (Figure 5 )  and - more 
important - the optimal abatement level is far greater. 
6. Abatement Strategies 
Before analyzing the costs and benefits of alternative strategies to cope with 
the greenhouse effect, let us consider the principal different kinds of policy 
responses that  have been proposed. There are two extreme cases: 
(1) No response: unfettered emission, no policy to prevent greenhouse warm- 
ing and adapt to  a warmer climate. 
(2) Halt the buildup of RIGS (responsible for warming) "immediately". 
Clearly all realistic policies lie between these extremes. For example, the 
recent proposal to  agree to reduce greenhouse emissions by 25% over the 
next decade would not halt warming, but would slightly reduce its rate of 
increase. 
As regards strategies, there are many options, a t  least in theory, some 
are listed below: 
(a)  Reduce energy consumption (and resulting C 0 2  emissions). 
(b)  Reduce C 0 2  emission/energy unit e.g., shift to natural gas, because of its 
lower carbon content per energy unit (Ausubel et al., 1988), or increase 
the use of nuclear energy. 
(c) Halt deforestation and accelerate reforestation. 
(d) Reduce CFC emissions, e.g., by shifting to  less harmful substitutes. 
(e) Divert C 0 2  from entering the atmosphere (e.g., by pumping into the 
ocean). 
'The classic example of the 'lock-in" phenomenon is the QWERTY typewriter key- 
board, which is known to be inefficient but which is so well established that it seems 
unchangeable (David, 1985). Another example might be the persistent use of the so-called 
'English system of weights and measures." For a theoretical discussion of positive returns 
to scale and self-reinforcing mechanisms in economics see (Arthur, 1983 and 1988; Arthur 
et al., 1987a and 1987b). 
(f) Remove C 0 2  from the atmosphere. 
(g) Reduce other RIG emissions (e.g., methane). 
(h) Offset climate effects, e.g., by painting roads and roofs white (albedo 
change) or by climate engineering (e.g., injecting submicron particles 
into the stratosphere). 
Some of the items on this list are clearly beyond present technological 
capabilities, and have been included only for the sake of completeness. In 
this category we include all the above items, recognizing, however, that  
future technological advances might alter this conclusion. It is recognized 
that  CFCs and other RIGS are much more potent than C 0 2  per unit mass, 
and that  energy-related activities do not account for more than about half 
of the total greenhouse emissions. However, the virtual elimination of CFCs 
is already recognized (by Nordhaus, and others) to  be both feasible and 
cost-effective, and we see no need to discuss it in the present context. The 
sources of methane and nitrous oxide are not yet well understood, but they 
appear to be largely b i~ log ica l .~  A major source of C 0 2 ,  as well, is from 
deforestation. Thus, a significant part of the greenhouse problem lies in 
the domain of agriculture, forestry, and land use. We do not consider this 
domain further in the present paper. 
In the following discussion we focus mainly on the costs and benefits 
of C 0 2  emission reduction by energy conservation and, where feasible, fuel 
substitution (items a ,  b). Nordhaus also considered two other possibilities: 
reforestation (item c) and CFC reduction (item d). We review the latter two 
options briefly in Appendices A and B, respectively. 
7. Costs of Combustion-Related Emission 
Reduction 
Ranking various alternative sources of energy and possibilities for switching 
to  less carbon-rich fuels in terms of cost-effectiveness enables one to  con- 
struct an abatement cost curve such as A ( z )  in Figures 5 or 6. Assuming 
5The difficulty in reducing methane emissions is that, so far as is now known, most of 
the increase in atmospheric methane in the last two centuries is due to increased cultivation 
of paddy rice and (to a lesser extent) the buildup in numbers of cattle and sheep. Barring a 
major breakthrough in genetic engineering, it will be very difficult to reduce these sources 
of emissions. The increasing substitution of natural gas for coal (e.g.,  in Europe) will also 
increase the leakage which constitutes the third largest source of methane emissions. 
the energy supply/conversion and industrial component of the economy "op- 
timizes" quickly to adjust to changing prices (hence, it is always in or near its 
instantaneous equilibrium) such models can be used to estimate cost curves 
for various policy assumptions. Nordhaus has, for example, estimated the 
costs of achieving a given energy output with successively lower amounts of 
COz production (Nordhaus, 1973 and 1976). He found that shadow costs 
could be expressed by a quadratic function of percentage emission reduc- 
tion. A similar result was later obtained econometrically (Nordhaus and 
Yohe, 1983). Nordhaus used this function (updated to 1989 prices) in his 
recent work (Nordhaus, 1989 and 1991). 
Another instance of this macro approach is found in the work of Manne et 
al. (1979).~ This is a major modeling effort linking a macro-economic model 
and an energy supply-conversion optimization model of the "activity" type. 
There are three underlying assumptions (1) that the economy is always in 
a quasi-equilibrium state, (2) that it "finds" the optimum supply mix for a 
given demand more or less instantaneously, and (3)  that energy consumption 
is both an input (factor), a cost of production, and a claim on resources. The 
former assumption means that energy appears as an input in a production 
function. When the production function is econometrically fitted to  past 
data on energy consumption, energy prices, and total output of goods and 
services, it is possible to estimate the reduction in output. This can be 
interpreted (somewhat loosely) as the economic "cost" of reducing energy 
inputs by a given amount. 
The interpretation of "lost gross output" as "cost of change" is justified 
for most economists by the notion that GNP is a measure of aggregate 
social welfare. This interpretation has been criticized, for various reasons. 
However, we do not propose to review the arguments pro and con here. 
Engineers and businessmen think of costs in a somewhat different and 
more traditional way. A businessman would try to compute cost as the 
annualized net additional capital and operating costs of investing in and 
using a new technology. It can happen, of course, that little or no new 
investment is needed or that the result of the substitution results in a net 
saving, rather than a net cost. 
For a business or a householder, a "net saving" translates into a profit, or 
a return on investment. The usual standard of comparison is money invested 
in high quality government bonds or, simply "money in the bank". In other 
'For an early review paper see Manne e t  al. (1979); also Manne (1981); Edmonds and 
Reilly (1985a and 1985b); Manne and Richels (1991). 
words, if a given investment produces a greater return (assuming equal risk) 
than money invested at  the current rate of interest, it is "profitable" in the 
above sense. If the rate of return is less than the interest rate, the investment 
is a loser. The usual target rate of return-on-investment (ROI) for business 
investments - which tend to be fairly risky, and which must allow for taxes on 
the profits - is typically around 30% per annum. If the best return that  can 
be realistically expected is only 15%, a prudent businessman will not make 
the investment. On the other hand, for a government (which does not have 
to  pay taxes and can borrow money a t  lower rates than a private business), 
an  8% or 10% expected rate of return is probably adequate ju~t i f ica t ion.~  
(This is sometimes equated roughly with the social discount rate, although 
the latter is usually taken to  be in the range of two to four percent in real 
terms.) 
Given that  capital is scarce, it is rational t o  invest in the most profitable 
ventures first. Thus, a business run by a profit maximizer should try to rank 
order the various proposals for capital spending (in order of expected ROI) 
and go down the list until either the available money for investment runs 
out or the minimum target rate-of-return threshold is reached. In principle, 
government should do the same. In an  equilibrium economy, there should 
be just enough capital to  fund all of the most promising projects, i.e., all the 
projects with expected ROI above the appropriate threshold level. It follows 
that  the really promising (i.e., profitable) projects should be funded as soon 
as they are identified. In an equilibrium economy there should be very few 
opportunities capable of yielding returns far above the average. By the same 
token, capital should not be available a t  all for projects with below-threshold 
ROIs. The existence of a class of under-funded projects with high ROIs, while 
another class of over-funded projects consistently yields below-norm ROI, is 
an indication of significant economic disequilibrium. 
In this context, i t  is relevant to  note that most large-scale energy supply 
projects (e.g., hydroelectric or steam-electric plants) yield a long-term real 
net rate of return between 5% and 10% (The  Economist, January 6 ,  1990, 
p. 59). Since this is below the threshold level for a rational tax-paying 
profit maximizer, i t  is difficult not to suspect that non-economic factors are 
involved in diverting capital into such investments. 
-- 
'Many projects are evaluated in terms of payback time rather than return. The two 
concepts are closely related. A project with a payback time of one year corresponds to 
100% return on investment. A project that pays for itself in six months has an annual 
return of 200%, and so on. 
On the other hand, there is ample evidence of under-utilization of prof- 
itable opportunities for conserving energy (e.g., Hirst and Hannon, 1979; 
Williams et al., 1983; ACEEE, 1984; Berman, 1985; Geller, 1985 and 1988; 
Goldemberg et al., 1987a and 1987b; Akbari et al., 1988; Lovins, 1988; 
Rosenfeld and Hafemeister, 1988; Nelson, 1989). In a major study carried 
out by the Italian energy research institute ENEA it was shown that  techno- 
logical "fixes" exist with payback times of one to  three years - well below the 
typical threshold for most firms and several times faster than investments in 
new supplies (e.g., d'Errico et al., 1984). 
Even more convincing evidence comes from the experience of the 
Louisiana Division of Dow Chemical Co. in the USA. In 1981 an "energy 
contest" was initiated, with a simple objective: to identify capital projects 
costing less than US$200,000 with payback times of less than one year (Nel- 
son, 1989). In its first full year (1982), 38 projects were submitted, of which 
27 were selected for funding. Total investment was US$1.7 million and the 
27 projects yielded an average ROI of 173%. (That is, the payback time 
was only about seven months). Since 1982, the contest has continued, with 
an increased number of projects funded each year. The ROI cutoff was re- 
duced year-by year to 30% in 1987, and the maximum capital investment 
was gradually increased. Nevertheless, in the year 1988, 95 projects were 
funded, for a total capital outlay of US$21.9 million and - surprisingly - an 
average ROI of 190%! The average submitted ROI for 167 audited projects 
over the entire seven years was 189%, while the actual (post-audit) average 
was 198%. Table 3 summarizes the results of the Dow experience. 
It is important to  note that ,  although the number of funded projects 
increased each year, there is (through 1988) no evidence of saturation. Nu- 
merous profitable opportunities for saving energy, with payback times well 
below one year, apparently still exist at  Dow even after the program has been 
in existence for seven years. One would have to suspect that  the program 
could still be expanded many-fold before reaching the 30% ROI threshold. 
Furthermore, i t  is important to emphasize that these opportunities exist 
even a t  relatively low US energy prices. Should taxes or a new energy cri- 
sis force US prices higher (i.e., toward world levels), the number of such 
opportunities would be multiplied further. 
At the macro-level, it has been argued in a study by the Mellon Institute 
that  a "least-cost" strategy for providing energy services for the USA in 
1978 would have utilized much less primary energy, and in a very different 
manner, than that  which was actually observed. In economic terms, the 
"least-cost" strategy would have saved US$800 per family (17%) or U S 4 3  
Table 3. Summary of Louisiana division contest results - all projects. 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Winning projects 27 3 2 3 8 59 60 92 95 
Capital, US$MM 1.7 2.2 4.0 7.1 7.1 21.8 21.9 
AverageROI(%) 173 340 208 124 106 77 190 
ROI cutoff (%) 100 100 100 50 40 3 0 30 
Savings, US$M/yr 
Fuel gasa 83 -63 1506 2498 798 2550 10790 
Capacity 1197 2578 
Maintenance 10 45 -59 187 357 2206 583 
Miscellaneous 19 -98 
Total savings 1590 3838 5341 7353 6894 11944 18023 
"All fuel gas savings are based on 1988 incremental fuel gas value. 
Source: Nelson (1989, Table 1). 
billion in that year alone (Sant, 1979). Taking the year 1973 as a standard 
for comparison, such a strategy would have involved a sharp reduction in 
the use of centrally generated electricity (from 30% to  17%) and a reduction 
in petroleum use from 36% to  26%. The only primary fuel to  increase its 
share would have been natural gas (from 17% to 19%). Interestingly, the 
Mellon study suggested that "conservation services" would have increased 
their share from 10% to  32% in the optimal case (see Figures 7 and 8 ) .  
What the Mellon study showed, in fact, is that (at  1978 energy prices) 
conservation, up to a point, would not have cost more (as Figure 5 implies) 
- it would have cost less (as in Figure 6).8 Between 1973 and 1978 "con- 
servation services" reduced actual energy consumption by 10% compared to 
'It should be noted that the Mellon study was thoroughly critiqued by a group at  MIT, 
at  the request of the Department of Energy (Berndt e t  al., 1981). The critique was exten- 
sive and detailed, and a number of significant substantive and methodological criticisms 
were offered. One criticism was directed at  the study's implication that a "least-cost" 
solution would be achieved automatically if the economy were truly competitive. The au- 
thors of the critique asserted that competition does not necessarily yield an optimal result 
and that regulation might be more effective. The critique also noted that some of the 
projected savings were "imposed" on the study, rather than being derived endogenously. 
The examples cited in this regard included projected savings by the use of variable-speed 
electric motors, co-generation of electric power and industrial process heat, and dieseliza- 
tion of the bus fleet. In retrospect, the benefits of variable speed motors were certainly 
exaggerated somewhat. However, in defense of the study, it should be noted that there is 
no way technological shifts such as the ones noted could be generated endogenously by any 
economic model. Moreover, a large number of other specific but minor opportunities for 
the 1973 baseline pattern; but a 32% reduction would have been not only 
possible, but cheaper! The differential between actual and potential is 22%. 
The greatest potential savings were to be found in the so called "buildings" 
sector (23%), but nontrivial savings (10%) were also available in the indus- 
trial sector. Significant opportunities also existed in industry, notably by 
avoiding (or in other words, using) waste heat by means of heat-cascading, 
heat pumps, and co-generation (of electricity and process heat). Assuming 
the Mellon Institute's figures to be roughly correct, the 22% unachieved but 
possible energy savings in 1978 would have reduced carbon dioxide produc- 
tion by a t  least 25% as compared to  actual emissions. This amounted to  
around 275 million tons. The monetary savings to energy consumers would 
have been US$43 billion, as noted, or about US$65 per ton of C 0 2  saved. 
This point would define the low point of the (negative) marginal cost of 
abatement curve in Figure 6. 
If the curve in Figure 6 is symmetric on both sides of this point, i t  follows 
that  a gross reduction in fossil energy use and C 0 2  emissions of roughly 50% 
should have been achievable (in 1978) a t  zero net cost to the economy as 
compared with the actuality. Clearly the optimum abatement level would 
be somewhat further to the right, perhaps around the 60% level, depending 
on the value of reducing emissions. 
Admittedly the 1978 disequilibrium might have been reduced somewhat 
in the last decade, and energy prices have (temporarily) dropped. The above 
calculation is illustrative, a t  best. Still, an increase in energy prices (via 
taxes) would merely increase the already clear benefits of investing in energy 
conservation. Others have arrived a t  similar conclusions (see, for example, 
Lovins et al., 1981). There is growing evidence supported by numerous ex- 
amples that  many investments in energy conservation can pay for themselves 
in reduced operating costs in a few months to a few years, even a t  present 
(lower) energy prices. 
Before moving on to  other issues, i t  is worthwhile commenting on the 
evident discrepancy between actual behavior and optimal behavior. Con- 
sumer behavior with regard to  energy conservation is sometimes dismissed 
as "stupidity-limited" (Schipper, 1989). However, what appears to be "stu- 
pidity" a t  first glance can be resolved into two other phenomena. One of 
the probable explanatory factors is inadequate information. (Information is 
saving energy via the use of available technology were necessarily overlooked, simply be- 
cause the authors had limited time and resources available to them. Thus, it is more likely 
that the extent of the conservation opportunities were underestimated than conversely. 
Figure 7. Energy sector market shares of various technologies. Note: The primary fuel equivalent of service 
demand in 1978 was 79.0 quads, plus 9.2 quads of improved efficiency (calculated against a base of stock and 
equipment in place in 1973) or a total of 88.2 quads. Actual service depends on the conversion efficiency of 
fuels and equipment utilized. 1 quad = a quadrillion = 1015 BTU. Another means of visualizing a quad is one 
million barrels per day of oil equivalent = 1015 BTU (quads) per year. Source: Sant (1979). 
(*) In t e r n  of primary fuel 
Figure 8. Industry energy service market shares of various technologies. Note: The primary fuel equivalent 
of service demand in 1978 was 28.2 quads, plus 7.9 quads of improved efficiency and 0.8 quads of biomass 
(calculated against a base of stock and equipment in place in 1973) or a total of 88.2 quads. Source: Sant 
(1979). 
Table 4. Estimated discount rates using mean 
population estimates. 
Number of Implied 
Income class observations discount rate 
not costless, in the real world.) It has been remarked that  lack of awareness 
by the consumer is a major impediment to increasing conservation in the 
end-use sector. Consumers focus today mainly on product color, size, and 
features and only a small amount on energy consumption during the appli- 
ance's lifetime. To some extent this can be countered by public information 
and awareness campaigns and government-sponsored information programs, 
such as "green labeling". 
The other phenomenon, which deserves more study, is that  individuals 
seem to display extremely high discount rates in their personal financial af- 
fairs. To put i t  simply, people will not voluntarily pay much extra or wait 
very long for promised savings in future operating costs of houses, automo- 
biles or appliances. One study, based on detailed survey data  on household 
appliance purchases, has inferred the average discount rate for consumers 
to be 20% (Hausman, 1979). It is strongly income dependent, however, as 
shown in Table 4 .  Note that  much higher discount rates are observed for 
households with very low incomes (89% for the poorest category). Trans- 
lated into payback times, consumer behavior among the lowest income group 
in the USA seems to correspond to personal "payback times" of the order 
of one year (or even less). 
Any investment that  pays for itself in much less than twenty years would 
be an  unambiguous economic gain a t  the macro-economic level. (This follows 
from the fact that  the average growth rate of the economy corresponds in a 
doubling time of the order of 20 years.) Businesses are generally happy to 
invest in moderately risky projects that  will pay for themselves in five years 
if they are successful. The existence of numerous opportunities for paybacks 
of one or two years, with almost no risk, is clear evidence of a nonequilibrium 
situation. 
Many economists have trouble with these implications. They ask: if, 
indeed, such opportunities really exist, why don't entrepreneurs operating 
in the competitive market place find and exploit the opportunities? The fact 
that this does not seem to be happening suggests that the opportunities are 
not real, after all; according to this view, there must be "hidden costs". 
We have no authoritative answer to the question. We think, however, 
that the basic answer is related to two facts: (1) The opportunities for 
energy conservation are mostly incremental; they require many small in- 
vestments, rather than a few massive ones. This is difficult for industry 
because of the second fact. (2) Large firms are central planners; they do 
not operate internally like competitive markets. Internal operations are bu- 
reaucratic, hierarchical, and "rule driven" rather than competitive. People 
with entrepreneurial instincts generally find it very difficult to function in 
bureaucracies or large firms. By the same token, large firms find it very dif- 
ficult to induce their employees to behave entrepreneurially. The reasons for 
this must be sought in the incentive systems that function in bureaucracies. 
8 .  Secondary Economic Benefits of C 0 2  
Reduction 
As noted above (Figures 5 and 6 ) ,  the economic benefit of emission reduction 
is equated with the corresponding damage reduction. A simple approxima- 
tion to damage reduction in the present case can therefore be obtained by 
dividing total "greenhouse" damages by total carbon dioxide. It was sug- 
gested by Nordhaus that the most probable cost of such damages would 
be US$3.30 per ton of C 0 2  eliminated, with an upper limit of US$37/ton 
(Nordhaus, 1989). We argued above that the first figure may be too low 
by a factor of ten, not even allowing for unquantified items such as loss of 
recreational and ecological assets. For reasons discussed previously we take 
the direct "greenhouse" benefits of eliminating C 0 2  to be at  least US$30 per 
ton. 
However, except for the deforestation component, carbon dioxide is al- 
most entirely produced by the burning of fossil fuels. This, in turn, generates 
emissions of air pollutants such as SO,, NO,, CO, and so on. It is literally 
impossible to eliminate combustion-related C 0 2  without cutting down on 
the other pollutants, even in the unlikely case that all of the reduction is 
accomplished at  the expense of the most benign of the fossil fuels, natural 
gas. In economic terms, greenhouse gases and conventional air pollutants are 
co-products. Hence the benefits of C 0 2  emission reduction must be equated 
to the full set of benefits of reduced fossil fuel (at least, coal and oil) combus- 
tion, whether it be achieved by regulation, conservation or taxation. The 
latter, in turn, include all of the health and environmental benefits of air 
pollution reduction. (It is important to observe that air pollution benefits 
due to reduced fuel consumption will be in addition to and independent of 
any benefits achieved by emission controls.) 
Of course, the air pollution and health costs of fossil fuel use depend 
on the specific fuel. They are much greater for coal, for instance, than for 
natural gas. One can monetize these benefits by a procedure that was first 
used for evaluating the social costs of road traffic and energy consumption in 
West Germany (Grupp, 1986; Hohmeyer, 1988). The major air pollutants 
cause damages at  very different concentration levels. Relative weighting 
factors in the German studies were chosen as follows: Particulates = 100; 
SO2 = 100; NO, = 125; VOC = 100; CO = 1. 
Since these toxicity weightings are derived mainly from animal exper- 
iments, the extrapolation to impacts on vegetation and materials remains 
questionable. However we know that SOz and NO, contribute roughly 
equally to  acidification, while CO, NO,, and the hydrocarbon components 
take part in photochemical reactions (leading to ozone production) in a 
rather complicated and interrelated manner. Since most of the monetized 
damages are linked to human health, these assumptions seem to be a defen- 
sible compromise. 
We also assume that the flow of annual damages from pollution (exclusive 
of the greenhouse effect) is approximately proportional to  current emissions. 
This means no accumulation effects are considered. Since the scope of our 
concern is global, no complex trans-border transport of pollutants need be 
considered. 
Table 5 shows emissions of traditional air pollutants in the FRG and the 
USA in the years 1975 to 1985, from all sources [including mobile sources 
(MS) and power plants (PP)]. These two categories account for most of the 
coal and petroleum, although some gas is used in electricity production and 
some oil is used for home heating. In effect, we are neglecting the pollutant 
effects of natural gas consumption. Weighting the data with the (toxicity) 
factors given above yields the results in Figure 9. Table 6 shows the result in 
relative shares for mobile sources and for the power plant sector in total air 
pollution for the FRG and USA. Table 7 gives total annual C 0 2  emission 
in these two sectors for each country. In effect Table 6 states that 39.5 
percent of all (1985) air pollution damages in the FRG are attributable to 
Table 5. Air pollutant emissions by sector (1000 t/yr). 
FRG USA 
1975 1980 1985" 1975 1980 1985" 
Particulates 
All 
MS 
PP 
SO2 
All 
MS 
P P  
NO, 
All 
MS 
PP 
H C  
All 
MS 
PP 
co 
All 
MS 
P P  
"OECD (1989). 
b ~ d j u s t e d  from Benkovitz (1982). 
'Adjusted from NAPAP (1990). 
d ~ d j u s t e d  from Hohmeyer (1988). 
vehicles and 27.4 percent to electric power generation. For the USA the 
corresponding figures were 27.5 percent and 33.4 percent. 
The highest costs of external effects of air pollution are health-related.g 
Respiratory diseases, for instance, lead to costs of medical treatment, in- 
creased morbidity (loss of working time plus direct costs of illness), and an 
increased risk of mortality. Many epidemiological studies have attempted to  
'Losses of quality of life are still not monetized. hence not included in any of the 
estimates. 

Table 6. Air pollution damages (% of total) 
from weighted emissions by sector. 
FRG mobile sources 30.9 34.5 39.5 
Power plants 31.6 31.2 27.4 
USA mobile sources 28.5 27.5 27.5 
Power ~ l a n t s  31.3 32.0 33.4 
Source: OECD (1989); NAPAP (1990)(II); Hohmeyer 
(1988). 
Table 7. Energy consumption and related C02 emissions - 1985. 
Conversion factor Electricity Transportation 
tCOz/toe Mtoe MtC02 Mtoe MtCO2 
FRG 
Coal 3.556 44.18 157.11 
Oil 2.707 1.42 3.84 42.08 113.93 
Gas 2.140 4.22 9.03 
Total 49.82 169.99 42.08 113.93 
USA 
Coal 3.556 357.37 1270.86 
Oil 2.707 25.12 68.01 445.75 1206.85 
Gas 2.140 72.66 155.49 
Total 455.15 1494.36 445.75 1206.85 
Source: OECD/IEA (1988). 
establish a relationship between ambient pollutant concentration and the in- 
cidence of acute and chronic diseases. Based on such studies (especially Lave 
and Seskin, 1971), Myrick Freeman estimated a pollution-mortality elastic- 
ity of 0.05, which means a 0.5% decrease in mortality for a 10% pollution 
reduction (Freeman, 1979; Freeman, 1982). He concluded that a 20% air 
pollution reduction in the USA would save between 2,780 and 27,800 lives 
per year. (Freeman's work is old, but has not been superseded.) 
The next step is to  impute the monetary valuation of morbidity and mor- 
tality benefits. While this is a highly controversial topic, i t  is unavoidable. 
In many policy areas it is necessary to  balance the value of saving human 
life (by investing in risk-reduction) against other benefits, implicitly if not 
explicitly. Freeman used a value of US$1 million per statistical life saved, 
based on individuals' apparent willingness to pay to reduce risk of mortality 
(Freeman, 1979). More recent US studies put the value of a statistical life 
at US$3 million (Portney, 1990). Others have used the loss of expected net 
future domestic income per capita to estimate the damages to society which 
range from US$0.3 to US$10 million per human life (e.g., Gaines et al., 1979; 
Grupp, 1986; Wicke, 1986). 
Freeman's best point estimate for the annual human health benefits of a 
20% reduction in air pollution for the USA was US$17 billion in 1978 prices 
(Freeman, 1979). Assuming linearity, this implies total damages of US$85 
billion per year. A more recent study for the EPA suggests that the annual 
benefits might be greater than Freeman's figure, but it is difficult to derive 
an annualized figure from the method used (Mathtech, 1983; OECD, 1984). 
For the FRG, one study estimates the annual total costs of respiratory 
diseases (assuming 29% to 50% are due to air pollution) to range from DM 
2.3 to  DM 5.8 billion (Wicke, 1986). Another estimate ranges from 6.8 
to 27.2 billion DM/yr (Grupp, 1986). Still another study yields damage 
estimates ranging from 1.6 to 40.3 billion DM/yr (Hohmeyer, 1988), based 
on figures given by (Euler, 1984). 
Air pollution also causes accelerated corrosion and weathering of ma- 
terials. For instance surface corrosion rates of zinc are five times higher in 
polluted areas than in clean-air regions, causing slow but significant damages 
to steel construction (Isecke, 1986). The need to enhance surface protection 
(of cables, for instance) increases costs in ways that are difficult to spec- 
ify precisely. Further sources of damages include corrosion of natural stone 
used in buildings and outdoor works of art such as sculptures (The Statue 
of Liberty and Cologne Cathedral, for example). 
Freeman estimated the benefits of a 20% reduction of air pollution for 
the USA to be about US$0.9 billion in the field of materials; this implies 
total damages (assuming linearity) of US$4.5 billion. In earlier times, when 
coal-burning was more widespread, Parrish found the total annual damages 
to  be some US$6 billion a year (Parrish, 1963). 
For the FRG annual damages from corrosion have been estimated by 
various people. One study set the figure at about 2.3 billion DM (Wicke, 
1986), based on updated studies by (Heinz, 1986). Grupp estimated annual 
costs of 3.2-4.2 billion DM (not including damages to cultural property and 
monuments, in contrast to additional window cleaning). Hohmeyer (1988) 
estimated the flow of damages from corrosion to be in the range of 2.3 to 4.2 
billion DM/yr. 
Air pollution also causes vegetation damages by acidic deposition of pho- 
tochemical oxidants (acid rain). Freeman estimated the benefits of a 20% 
air pollution reduction in terms of reduced damage to  vegetation to  be in the 
range of US$0.2-US$2.4 billionlyr (Freeman, 1979). Total damages would, 
of course be five times greater. Crocker arrived at more narrowly bounded 
figures of US$3.1 billionlyr, including forest losses of US$1.75 billion, agri- 
cultural losses of US$1 billion, and aquatic ecosystem damages of US$0.3 
billion (Crocker, 1979). 
In Europe, the most visible and severe damages to vegetation are found in 
the forests. One study evaluated the forest decline as an annual loss of value 
of 5.5 to  8.8 billion DM (Ewers et al., 1986). Hohmeyer estimated additional 
damages to  agricultural crops of 1 billion DM/yr (Hohmeyer, 1988). No 
damages to wild flora and fauna were taken into account. Recent studies 
at IIASA have estimated air pollution-related losses to European forests 
(excluding the USSR) to be US$23 billion annually (in 1987 US$/yr) of 
which roughly 30 percent is attributable to reduced harvests and 70 percent 
to lost recreational and other benefits (Nilsson, 1990). To this must be added 
a further US$7.4 billion in losses from the European USSR. 
Tables 8 and 9 summarize the numbers chosen by Freeman and Hoh- 
meyer (Freeman, 1979; Hohmeyer, 1988). Note that both authors assume 
large confidence intervals which should be interpreted as the possible range 
of values of minimum cost figures. The figures are underestimates, to the 
extent that some important components are still omitted, for example loss of 
quality of life. Using Tables 8 and 9 we can relate damages to specific types 
of fuel consumption. Freeman's damage figures are based on the benefits of 
pollution control with a 20% reduction - over ten years ago. However, as 
shown in Figure 9 the level and composition of emissions in the USA has 
not changed dramatically since the 1970s. 
For the purposes of this study, the decline in emissions is assumed to  be 
compensated roughly by the increase in prices. For the US transport sector, 
we impute benefits of 0.275 x US$107 = US29.4 billionlyr associated with 
1315 Mt-C02/yr emissions. This yields a net benefit of US$22 per ton of 
C 0 2  eliminated by consuming less petroleum based fuels. Similarly, for the 
electricity sector, we obtain 0.334 x US$107 = US$35.7 billionlyr. Dividing 
by related emissions of 1532.54 Mt-C02 implies a benefit of US$23 per ton of 
C 0 2  eliminated, mainly by consuming less coal. EPA is currently conducting 
a major review of air pollution damages. Unpublished and unofficial EPA 
estimates in 1988 set the damages at US$750 per ton of SO2 eliminated, 
US$700 per ton of VOC eliminated, and US$70 per ton of NO, eliminated, 
with a fairly wide range of uncertainty. If we were to  assume that a ton of 
C 0 2  were to  be eliminated by burning correspondingly less coal (2.5% S), 
Table 8. Annual benefits of an air pollution reduction of 20% (billion 
1978 US$/yr). 
Damages to USA Range Best point Percent 
Health 3.1-39.3 16.8 80% 
Soil 
Vegetation 
Materials 
Other 
Total 4.4-57.0 21.4 100% 
(USg21.4: -80%, +166%) 
Source: Freeman (1979). 
Table 9. Estimated annual damages from air pollution by type of 
damage (billion DM/year). 
Damages to FRG Range Center Percent 
Health 
Materials 
Vegetation 
Total 10.4-54.0 32.2 100% 
(DM 32.2 *67%) 
Source: Hohemeyer (1988). 
the reduction in SO2 emissions alone would be about 0.017 tons, worth 
0.017 x US$750 = US$12.75. Allowing for the benefits of eliminating other 
pollutants, our figure of US$23 per ton appears reasonable. 
Based on similar calculations for the FRG, air pollution damage from 
mobile sources amounts to  103 DM (roughly U S 5 7  at  current exchange 
rates) per ton of C 0 2  eliminated. For electricity generation, we obtain 51 DM 
(US$28) per ton of C 0 2  eliminated. The fact that the German figures are 
higher than the US figures is understandable, in view of the fact that damages 
are a function of exposure, and the FRG is a more densely populated country. 
I t  should be emphasized, again, that these figures are not precise. In fact, the 
range of uncertainty on the upper side is of the same order as the number, 
while on the lower side it is half the number. 
9. Conclusions for Policy 
It is not our purpose to try to establish an optimal policy instrument 
to induce energy conservation, nor even an optimal tax policy (given the 
economists usual prejudice in favor of taxes over regulation). In this con- 
text, it seems to  us that optimality is an inappropriate goal. Not only is it 
essentially impossible to achieve, but the time and effort expended on the 
debate is a distraction from the real issue. Current policies were not opti- 
mized from an economic perspective, nor is the political system conducive to  
optimization. But it is not difficult to assemble persuasive arguments that 
almost any tax on extractive resources - especially those whose intensive use 
results in large, unpaid social and environmental costs - is preferable to the 
present system of taxing labor (either directly or in the guise of value-added), 
assets (capital) and consumption. 
Taxation is unquestionably an effective method of modifying social 
behavior, from consumption to investment, as economists have long 
recognized.10 A general principle of tax policy should be to reduce or elim- 
inate taxes on desirable behavior (such as personal savings or capital in- 
vestment) and to increase taxes on undesirable consumption items such as 
cigarettes or alcoholic beverages. With respect to the consumption of energy 
(mostly from fossil fuels) and other environment-destroying toxic substances, 
however, tax policy in the USA is contradictory. Most countries set very high 
taxes on all forms of energy use, especially automotive gasoline. (Despite 
high taxes, the energy and automotive industries of Europe and Japan re- 
main healthy.) The USA does not tax energy or toxic materials use, despite 
an obvious need for more government revenue, out of political concern for 
the jobs that might be lost. 
With respect to revenues, the assumption made by many conservatives 
is that revenues siphoned out of the private sector by any tax will be used 
totally unproductively by the government. Liberals, on the other hand, seem 
to assume just the opposite. In the present context, the liberal assumption 
would be that revenues from a carbon tax (or a sulfur tax) would be au- 
tomatically used to compensate for the environmental damages caused by 
''The major argument of the supply-siders in the early Reagan years was that exces- 
sive taxes on income would discourage productive effort, whence tax-cuts would actually 
generate new entrepreneurial activity. The long-standing argument ior eliminating capital 
gains taxes is based on similar notions. Virtually all economists would agree that income 
or capital gains tax cuts are stimulative. The major argument is whether the revenue gains 
for the government would exceed the losses, which is a very different issue. 
the buildup of C 0 2  or SO,. The truth is certainly not so simple, either 
way. But, disregarding the use of the tax revenues, it would still be socially 
beneficial to  impose such a tax as long as its net cost to energy users (i.e., 
society) is less than the social benefits - reduced environmental damages - 
of lower fossil fuel combustion. 
For each ton of C 0 2  eliminated, we estimated these benefits as follows: 
US$30 for natural gas (based on greenhouse effects of C 0 2  alone, ignoring 
likely methane leakage which would probably justify a much higher tax), 
US$52/ton for petroleum and US$53/ton for coal in the USA. Two fifths 
of the benefits in the case of petroleum and coal are attributable to  asso- 
ciated reductions in other pollutants, notably NO,, SO,, particulates, and 
unburned hydrocarbons. For the FRG the petroleum and coal figures are, 
respectively, US$87 and US$58.11 In the case of the FRG, health-related 
benefits of reduced NO, and SO, outweigh climate benefits. 
To obtain this assumed benefit, consumption must be reduced by raising 
the effective price to consumers. The reduction in consumption resulting 
from a rise in price (or tax) depends on the price elasticity of demand. 
(The less elastic the demand, the greater the reduction in consumption per 
increment of added price). Nobody knows exactly what the price elasticity 
of demand for petroleum or coal is, but a number that "seems more or less 
right" to most economists is -0.3. That is, a fuel price increase of 1% would 
result in a drop of 0.3% in demand for that form of fuel. Roughly, a 100% 
increase in the price of fuel would result in a 30% cut in use. 
Coal costs about US$5O/ton. It is about 80% carbon. To obtain a 
reduction of one ton of C 0 2  (worth more than US$30 in terms of climatic 
benefits and more than US$20 in terms of air-quality benefits) consumption 
of 0.273 tons of coal-carbon must be eliminated. This corresponds to 0.34 
tons of coal not burned. Assuming a price elasticity of -0.3, this is the 
reduction that would be achievable by increasing the price to consumers by 
100%. In short, any tax that doubles the price of coal (i.e., US$5O/ton) 
would save over US$50 in environmental costs to the society as a whole, 
while also producing about US$33 in net revenues for the government - to 
use productively, or not. In the US, based on a pre-tax consumption of 500 
million tons per annum, such a tax would cut consumption by 170 million 
tons and generate US$16.5 billion in revenues. 
"To convert these benefit numbers to dollars per ton of actual fuel, remember that 
each ton of carbon dioxide emitted corresponds to 0.273 tons of carbon in the fuel, so the 
benefit is in proportion. 
Of course, there would also be both short term adjustment costs (e.g., 
shifts to natural gas or untaxed fuels) and long-term "drag" costs on the  
economy. The effect of the higher coal price would be passed through, for 
instance, to the steel industry and to the consumers of steel products; sim- 
ilarly i t  would affect the cost of electricity and all users of electricity. The 
end result would be a structural shift further away from energy-intensive 
industries and towards energy conservation services and non-fossil sources 
of energy (such as solar electricity). 
Yohe and his colleagues investigated the potential drag effects of a 100% 
carbon t ax  (phased in over the 20 years from 2000-2020) or an equivalent 
consumption restriction (Yohe et al., 1989). Their assumptions are based on 
work suggesting that  the sudden increases in petroleum prices that  occurred 
in 1973 and 1979 caused drops in productivity growth (Olson, 1988). It is 
assumed that  any tax  on fossil fuels would have the same depressing effect. 
Assuming productivity drops ranging from 0.05% p.a. to  0.7% pea. for a 
carbon tax  amounting to 100% of current prices, cumulative lost productivity 
of US$75 to US$550 billion would be experienced up to  the year 2010. 
This approach is not very convincing, for two reasons. First, the essence 
of the "oil shock" was that  money was taken from western producers and con- 
sumers and deposited in bank accounts belonging to (predominantly) OPEC 
members. They, in turn, increased their spending for consumer goods, mili- 
tary goods, and long- term infrastructure projects, none of which contributed 
to  increased productivity in the west. On the other hand, the impact of a tax 
collected within the western economies would, of course, depend on how the 
money was spent. However, if the new tax were offset dollar for dollar by a 
reduction in other taxes, there is no reason to expect an automatic depress- 
ing effect on the economy. Second, we note that  the observed productivity 
drop since 1973-1974 has many other possible explanations, of which the 
most widely accepted seems to be that  i t  reflects the inevitable "catchup" 
of the US by Europe and Japan.12 
In summary, we think a carbon tax (proportional to  the carbon content in 
different fuel types) and/or a sulfur tax (proportional to  the sulfur content in 
the airborne or water-borne emissions) would be consistent with the so-called 
''In fact, an OECD Seminar on the "Apparent Productivity Paradoxn held in June 1989 
and attended by a number of the world's top economists, considered in detail a number 
of the extant theories of the decline in productivity growth since 1972-1973. The rise in 
energy prices as a causal factor was not even discussed. This does not mean that energy 
prices played no role, but it appears that most economists who attended no longer believe 
that role to have been crucial. 
"polluter-pays" principle and would avoid some of the administrative burden 
associated with regulation. In order to avoid severe market disturbances, 
such a tax should be slowly phased in (over one or two decades), in the 
context of international cooperation. We strongly suggest that the (rather 
high) tax revenues could (and should) be used to reduce other forms of 
taxes. As we have noted, such taxes now fall mainly on labor, capital, and 
trade, economic activities that should be encouraged - insofar as they do not 
involve the use of fossil fuels or toxic materials - rather than discouraged. 
It is interesting to compare our final results with those of Nordhaus 
(1989), in terms of marginal shadow costs of abatement. The Nordhaus 
analysis assumed that the cost of abatement rises monotonically with the 
degree of abatement, i.e., percentage of C02-equivalent reduction. The ma- 
jor policy conclusions of his analysis were as follows: 
CFC phase-out is the lowest cost option. Total elimination would cut 
the COz-equivalent emissions by 14%. A high gasoline tax would be the 
next most effective policy option. 
Reforestation is not a cost-effective option (at marginal costs assumed to 
be US$lOO/ton of C 0 2  removed). 
The shadow costs of C 0 2  reduction by a global carbon tax would exceed 
the benefits except at low levels of abatement. It is not an efficient policy. 
For the case of high costs associated with greenhouse warming 
(US$37/ton of carbon dioxide or equivalent RIG) the optimal policy would 
yield a 28% reduction in C02-equivalent emissions and 94% reduction of 
CFC use. 
We have arrived at  significantly different conclusions, partly because we 
disagree with the underlying cost assumptions, and partly because we have 
tried to take into account ancillary benefits of policies that would reduce 
other pollution-related damages. 
In our view, as stated above, the most cost-effective policy is likely to 
be energy conservation combined with substitution of natural gas for other 
fuels to  the extent dictated by direct cost savings. This would reduce energy 
consumption by 20% or so and carbon dioxide emissions by about 25% com- 
pared to present levels, though the overall impact on RIG emissions would 
be more like 12%. The most effective policy to bring about this degree of 
conservation would be a carbon tax on all fossil fuels supplemented by a 
sulfur emissions tax on sulfur-containing fuels. 
The virtual elimination of CFCs, as suggested by Nordhaus, would prob- 
ably be the next most cost-effective policy, with a further 14% reduction in 
RIGS. Further abatement beyond that would be achievable by some combi- 
nation of further energy conservation, fuel substitution, and the introduction 
of non-polluting solar (or other) energy sources, combined with extensive re- 
forestation. We are unable to evaluate the relative costs and benefits of these 
policies in more detail a t  this time, however. 
Appendix A: Forests 
A popular proposal is to  sequester excess atmospheric carbon dioxide by 
means of photosynthesis, using large plantations of fast-growing trees as a 
sink. To halt the present annual atmospheric increase of carbon (2.9 Gt 
of C per year) by massive afforestation, the required land area in temper- 
ate climate regions would be about 465 million hectares (Mha) (Sedjo and 
Solomon, 1990). This is equal to 1.5 times the present forest area of the 
USA or 15% of the global forest area. The land requirement is large but not 
totally out of the question. For instance, it is biologically feasible to  double 
the biomass density (see, for example, Sedjo and Solomon, 1990; Ranney et 
al., 1987). 
Planting costs are estimated to  be between US$230-US$1000/ha (av- 
eraging US$400/ha). In the USA suitable land costs roughly US$400- 
US$1000/ha, although in some regions i t  would be lower. Land costs repre- 
sent real opportunity costs, since land used as carbon sink cannot be used 
for crops of pasture. The prospects of finding a large area of suitable land 
in the western countries appears slim. However, it is estimated that there 
is a t  least 500 Mha of degraded or deforested tropical land (Houghton and 
Woodwell, 1989). Degraded land costs much less; in Indonesia total costs 
of US$400/ha are indicated (Sedjo and Solomon, 1990); in India, costs are 
even lower (Myers, 1989). 
Total costs of U S 3 7 2  billion for new plantations in temperate zones and 
U S 1 8 6  billion in the tropics, would result in marginal costs of reducing 
COz of US$35/ton and US$17/ton respectively (Sedjo and Solomon, 1990). 
These figures are in sharp contrast to the pessimistic US$200/ton estimated 
by Nordhaus (Nordhaus, 1989). 
Appendix B: Reducing CFCs 
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are chemically inert compounds, used as sol- 
vents, propellants, and refrigerants. They are not readily degraded by chem- 
ical reactions in the lower atmosphere. As a consequence, CFCs gradually 
diffuse into the stratosphere where they are effective absorbers of long-wave 
(IR) thermal radiation. Because CFCs are about 20,000 times more effi- 
cient than C 0 2  as IR absorbers, the two most common CFCs, CFC-11 and 
CFC-12, alone contribute about 14% of all RIG emissions. 
The replacement of CFCs is relatively cost efficient because of the small 
quantities involved. It is fairly easy to  find substitutes for the propellant and 
solvent uses. The most difficult use to  dispense with is refrigeration and air- 
conditioning. However, there are a variety of technically feasible substitutes 
for CFCs with shorter atmospheric lifetimes and/or less absorption strength 
in  the critical frequency band. Despite some disadvantages such as greater 
flammability and reduced efficiency as refrigerants it is reasonable to assume 
substitution costs of the order of US$5/kg, or about US$ 0.25/ton of C 0 2  
equivalent eliminated (Pool, 1988). 
Problems will arise in developing countries. China, for instance, is plan- 
ning to  raise refrigerator production by the year 2000, and to boost CFC 
production to levels tenfold higher than those in the USA today; China did 
not sign the Montreal Protocol (Miller, 1989). 
A non-trivial incidental benefit of CFC reduction would be a slower rate 
of depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer. We have no quantitative esti- 
mate of monetary worth of this, however. 
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